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Chapter pages in book: (p. 19 - 44)WARTIME FUNCTIONING OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
It is against this background of rapidly growing expenditures, rev-
enues, and deficits, and increasingly extensive price and production
controls, that the Canadian financial system has functioned in war-
time. Financial institutions are affected by taxes and direct controls,
but most of them by their very nature are more immediately con-
cerned with government borrowing than with any other aspect of
war finance. Canadian national debt rose by 130 percent in four
years of war, and while this increase is only half the rise in American
debt in the same four years, it is nonetheless substantial. This sec-
tion is primarily concerned with the role of various institutions in
these government loan operations.
The Department of Finance
The Department of Finance, analogous to the United States Treas-
ury, is the fulcrum of Canadian war finance. It has a large share of
the responsibility for determining fiscal policy; it collects taxes, ex-
ercises supervisory powers over foreign exchange and price control
programs, borrows money, and disburses public funds. Through
the Department of Munitions and Supply, with some guidance from
the Department of Finance, the government made $820 million of
the estimated billion dollar investment in war plant expansion up
to the end of 1942.' To implement this investment, government-
owned corporations have been organized, such as Polymer Corpora-
tion, Atlas Plant Extension Limited, Park Steamship Co. Limited,
Wartime Shipping Limited, Wartime Housing Limited, and others;
they are managed by prominent businessmen under the general
guidance of the Department of Munitions and Supply. In some
cases, the latter Department has also financed the expansion of
existing plants, but has retained ownership of the new equipment
that it provided. As may. be seen from Table 3,- the government has
concentrated its investment in industries with.little or no peacetime
demand for its products.
The government has also advanced over $900 million in working
capital to war industries, and has used the "special depreciation priv-
lege" as a more indirect form of assistance in financing war plants.
This privilege was granted less readily in 1943 than earlier in the
17Originally,some $200 million of the total investment was made by the British
government, but British interests have since been bought out by the Canadian
government.
19TABLE 3— GOVERNMENT LOANS TO WAR INDUSTRY






Working Capital Advances $903 .100%
Fixed Capital Commitments 821 84
General munitions 543 82
Government-owned and operated plants 119 100
Aircraft 76 61
Arsenals and other Crown plants 59 100
Shipbuilding and repairs 24 68
Source: Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons (March 26, 1943).
war, and the itax bill imposed penalties on firms obviously mis-
using this privilege. Government guarantees of loans by banks to
war industries at rates close to the yield on government bonds, sim-
ilar to the American "V" loans, have been proposed as a substitute
for direct government financing.
Public subscriptions to war bonds have accounted for almost 75
percent of loan funds. As the figures in Table 4 reveal, public issues
have grown from i percent of total net borrowing in the first year
of war to 95 percent in the fourth year. The public issues have con-
sisted of intermediate-term bonds (21/26 years) bearing 11/221/4 per-
cent interest, and long-terms (8-16 years) with a 331/4 percent cou-
pon. (The record and features of the seven War Loans undertaken
to the end of 1943 are set forth in Table .)
Specialwartime issues to banks, in the form of 1- to 5-year notes
and bonds carrying 1-2 percent interest, have been next in impor-
tance to public loans. However, these special issues have dwindled
in size as the war has progressed, partly because of the increasing suc-
cess of public loan campaigns and partly because of the introduction
of a new credit instrument, the deposit certificate. This is a six
months' security issued only to banks, bearing 3/4 of i percent in-
terest. Deposit certificates have produced nearly as large a volume
of funds as special issues to banks, and have tended to replace Treas-
ury bills as well.
War savings certificates have accounted for only 3.6 percent of
loan receipts up to August 31, 1943. The return on savings certifi-
cates is tax free, and slightly higher than on bonds of comparable



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.denomination makes them somewhat less convenient for large hold.
ings. Critics of the war savings campaign point to the negligible re-
turns, and argue that the small sales of savings certificates have been
at the expense of subscriptions to war loans. Government spokes-
men, on the other hand, contend that the $211million obtained is
"very good money" —thatis, likely to have come almost entirely from
current consumption.
The case is not altogether clear.. It is possible that the purchase
of either war loans or savings certificates might be financed by the
creation of new mone.y or by the activation of idle money. While it
is true that war savings certificates, unlike bonds, cannot be resold
to banks, they can be redeemed after six months; redemptions have
been running between 20 and 30 percent of sales six months be-
fore,'8 or about 11/4 percent of the total eligible for. redemption.
Monthly sales reached their peak in March '94', while redemptions
show a marked upward trend. After this time, there was a drop in
sales which no doubt was connected with the shift in promotional
emphasis from savings certificates to Victory Bonds. With the an-
nouncement of each successive budget, current sales have dropped
and redemptions have increased sharply. From March 31 to August
31,1943 redemptionswere over 40 percent of sales six months
before. In those months, redemptions ranged from 1.4 tO 1.9percent
of the total eligible for redemption. By the end of August 1943,
cumulativeredemptions for the whole war period had reached 20
percentof the total eligible.1' On the other hand, in support of the
savings campaign, it must be pointed out that savings certificates or
stamps can be bought by people whose incomes do not permit
subscriptions to bonds, even with the instalment-payment privilege
that has been granted in the five Victory Loans. Its significance lies
largely in the educational and psychological value of having as many
people as possible partiipate in government war borrowing.
The Department of Finance has apparently been anxious to min-
imize interest cost, and has set maturities as short and the yields as
18Inthe United States the redemption of Series E bonds has been running about 13
percent of sales two months before and has shown a tendency to increase in relation to
total sales. Only an approximate comparison of American experience in Series E bonds
with Canadian experience in war savings certificates is justified, since E bonds can he
bought up to $5,000 per year.
19Atthat time cumulative redemptions of United States Series E bonds were 9 percent























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.low as seemed expedient. (The Canadian investor is used to shorter
maturities and higher yields than the American.) While there is no
announced policy of pegging the level and maintaining the patterli
of interest rates as in the United States, the Department of Finance
nevertheless feels that higher coupon rates would not call forth sig-
nificantly greater sums and would needlessly raise the cost of war
finance. It also feels a "moral obligation" to maintain the value of
its securities. Canadian policy has been to collect as much as pos-
sible in taxation, borrow as much as possible from the public at
roughly 3 percent for long-terms and 1½ to 2 percent for medium-
terms, and to borrow the balance needed to meet government ex-
penditures by sales of special obligations to the banking system. Th'e
recent reduction in the Bank of Canada rediscount rate is evidence
of the government's intention to maintain current interest levels.
The Department's large-scale borrowing operations have actually
been accomplished with a reduction of the average yield on govern-
ment securities. At 2.6 percent, the ave'rage rate on Federal obliga-
tions at the close of fiscal iwas the lowest in history, and nearly
1percentbelow the prewar level. Yields on long-term securities and
obligations have tended to fall, while yields on intermediate-term
securities (2 to 5 years) have risen slightly. Interest rates in general
have been higher in Canada than in the United States or in the
United Kingdom, but the spread between the Canadian yields and
those in the other two countries has been considerably reduced dur-
ing the war. The development of interest structures in this period is
shown in Chart IV.
In August and September 1939,themarket for government obli-
gations broke sharply in Canada, as it did in Great Britain and in the
United States. The market price of the 3 percent of June 1955,for
example, fell from $100.38 in July to $91.00 m September. The
market recovered much of its losses in October, and since then the
chief characteristic of the Canadian market for government securi-
ties has been stability around a gently rising price trend. In the case
of each war loan, the dealers' prices have fallen slightly below par
for some months after issue. The Bank of Canada has imposed ,re-
strictions for periods varying from a few days to a few months on
below-par offers made to the public by dealers. In some cases the low
'dealer's price was reached before, and in other cases after, these re-














Source: Bank of Canada, Statistical Summary (December 1943-January 1944).
%to/8, and has included a dealer's commission of 1/8 to 1/4.Alllong-
term loans rose above par within a few months of their issue, to a
certain extent because of their closer approach to maturity and be-
cause of the pattern of rates increasing with maturity.20
The National War Finance Committee
The National War Finance Committee is the latest, and probably
the last, organization to be set up for selling wartime issues to the
public. Its establishment by the Minister of Finance in January
20 See W. Braddock Hickman, The Term Structure of Interest Rates (National Bureau
of Economic Research, Financial 'Research Program, ms. 1942).
25













0)0)0)0)0) C)00J(')1942, just before the Second Victory Loan campaign, was the final
step in the unification of the government sales organization. The
functions and many of the personnel of the former War Savings and
Victory Loan Committees were absorbed by the NWFC. Its objec-
tives were later announced as follows:
"Under present plans, future operations of NWFC contemplate
(a) a continuous program of public education in the national and
personal need for, and advantages of, voluntary savings during the
war years,(b)the continuous sales promotion of War Savings
Certificates and Stamps, (c) the sale of two Victory Loans in each
year, one in the Spring months and another in the Fall, and (d)
the development, of a better public understanding of the advan-
tages, both national and personal, to be realized through reten-
tion, at least for the duration of the war, of securities purchased
during the war years."2'
The NWFC itself is made up of the National Executive Com-
mittee and representatives of major industries, agriculture, labor,
commerce, finance, women's organizations and so forth, some 6o
persons in all. In addition there are Committees in each province,
and some 460 Local Units. The administrators in the central office
constitute the National Management Committee, and they,to-
gether with the Chairmen of the Provincial Committees, comprise
the National Executive Committee. The entire permanent full-
time' staff of the NWFC is less than 400 persons. This nucleus is
supplemented by somei 25,000 voluntary workers attached to'
Local Units, about 17,000 temporary workers hired by the Corn.
mittee and salesmen selling on a commission basis, and about 1,850
investment dealers and brokers.
The work of the NWFC is carried out by five Divisions. The
"Special Names Division" recruits its personnel from officers of in-
vestment and brokerage houses, and canvasses corporations, finan-
cial institutions, government agencies, and individuals believed Ca-
21 Mr. Ilsley to the House of Commons, June 28, 1943. The first two War Loans were
organized by the Bank of Canada,, acting as fiscal agent of the government, with the
assistance of a Special Advisory Committee consisting of representatives of bond dealers
and chartered banks. The War Savings Committee was established in May 1940 when
war savings certificates and stampi were introduced. Partly because of thedis-
appointing public response to the Second War Loan, a Victory Loan Committee was
organized in June 1941 to market the First Victory Loan. Personnel consisted of
professional dealers, voluntary workers, general canvassers enrolled in each locality.
and insurance agents and others made available by their employers.
26pable of subscribing $25,000 or more. "Special Names" investors
have accounted for some 6o percent of Victory Loan subscriptions.
The "Payroll Savings Division" covers the armed forces, and em-
ployees with incomes up to $3,ooo in concerns with a minimum of
25 employees, or 50 111 Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. No
commissions are paid on subscriptions in the Special Names and
Payroll Savings Divisions.
The "General Sales Division" deals with the rest of the potential
investing public. To a large extent, the technique in this Division
consists of house-to-house canvass. Commissions are paid to indi-
vidual canvassers amounting in the aggregate to 1/8 of i percent on
medium-term and /8 of1 percent on long-term issues, and are
usually "pooled" and shared on some pre-established basis. The re-
muneration of dealers and brokers is determined by the Minister of
Finance on the basis of services rendered. Subscribers designate
some bank through which they wish their bonds delivered, and the
banks are paid a handling fee of 1/8 of i percent on short-term and
1/4 of i percent on long-term issues.22
Advertising is handled by the "Public Relations Division." The
general policy of this Division is to try every attack that might sell
bonds: reasoning about the relation of bond sales to inflation, threats
of military disaster if bonds are not bought, promises of earlier, vic-
tory if they are, radio programs, parades, perambulating public
address systems, movie stars, slogans —nodevice holding any possi-
bility of success is slighted. Finally, the "Administrative Division"
consists of full-time personnel concerned with organization and
supervision of the whole process.
As a war service, insurance agents and banks have voluntarily
undertaken to sell war savings certificates and stamps without com-
mission. As in the United States, war savings stamps may be bought
in post offices, chain stores, moving picture theatres, railway offices,
22 on the first two War Loans, the commission to individual canvassers wasof 1
percent. The banks as a whole received a fixed proportion of total commissions pay-
able, which was then reallocated among individual banks. On the First Victory Loan
(Third War Loan) the commissions to individual salesmen wereof 1 percent on
short-term, and % of 1 percent on long-term, for all sales other than 'Special Names";
there was no Payroll Division at that time. For the Second Victory Loan the rates
were % of 1 percent higher in each case, but no commissions were paid on conversion
subscriptions. The banks received service fees of 1/4of1 percent on all bonds handled
under the first two Victory Loans.
27insurance offices, and the like. Customers are urged to take change
in savings stamps. Emphasis has been laid upon the desirability of
commitments for regular purchases, and in most large firms pay-
deduction agreements have been obtained from employees.
The success of the NWFC is revealed by the fact that subscrip-
tions to the Seventh War Loan were over six and a half times as
great as for the First War Loan and the number of subscribers i
timesas great, despite lower yields. The over-all cost of the Victory
Loan campaigns, including publicity and engraving, has been kept
below ipercentof the amount of money raised.
Bank of Canada
The basic wartime policy of the Bank of Canada has been to provide
the chartered banks with sufficient reserves to meet credit require-
ments and drains on cash, and to enable them to buy enough gov-
ernment securities to maintain a stable and orderly market. Open
market operations have been the means to this end, and no attempt
has been made to use the rediscount rate to influence bank reserves.
The rate was held constant at 2½ percent from the Bank's inception
to February 8, 1944.Itsreduction to 11/2percentat that time was not
designed to facilitate replenishment of bank reserves by borrow-
ing from the central bank. The chartered banks do not borrow sig-
nificant amounts from the Bank of Canada, and it is not expected
that they will. The purpose of the lower rate was to serve notice that
the Bank's "easy money" policy would be pursued during and after
the war, and that no rise in interest rates should be expected. As
indicated in Table 6, the effects on bank reserves of Bank of Canada
operations have been expansionary in every year since the war be-
gan, and the rate of expansion has shown a distinct tendency to in-
crease.
The first war budget message of September '939 took the position
that easy money in the early stages of war would be not merely htrm-
less but distinctly useful, particularly in stimulating the rapid ab-
sorption of excess industrial capacity and unemployment. Central
bank policy followed this principle in the fall of '939 when the drain
on chartered bank cash was unusually severe. There was a super-
normal demand for agricultural credit to move the bumper wheat
crop, the second highest on record; higher incomes, increasing busi-
ness activity, an outflow of United States currency in response to the
28TABLE 6— EFFECT OF CENTRAL BANK POLICY ON CHARTERED
BANK RESERVES, WAR YEARS 1940-43
'(in millions)
Balance Sheet Changes a
Twelye MonthsEnding August 31
Total
1940 1941 1942 1943
Assets
Gold and exchange reserves $ —260 $38 $—40 $37 $ —225
Dominion-Provincial securities 388 110 209 270 977
Liabilitiei
Notes held by public 114 105 152 185 556
Dominion government and other S
deposits —5 34 — 28 27 28
Rest fund and other liabilities
less subsidiarycoin — 8 1 14 — 7 0
Increase in chartered bank reserves 27 8 31 102 168
Sources: Bank of Canada, Statistical Summary and Monthly Statements, various issues.
a Increases in central bank assets add to chartered bank reserves, increases in central
bank liabilities reduce chartered bank reserves.
premium on American funds, and the general uncertainty accom-
panying the outbreak of war resulted in a considerable increase in
note circulation. Finally, in accordance with its expansionist policy,
the Department of Finance arranged a loan with the banks for $200
million. To meet this situation, the Bank of Canada purchased
securities, and thus permitted the banks to meet these various drains
without sacrificing their customary reserve ratio of io percent
against deposits.
The remainder of the $388 million increase in Bank pf Canada
holdings of government securities during the first year of war is
accounted for mainly by an arrangement made under the Foreign
Exchange Acquisition Order of April 30, 1940, by which the Bank
sold to the Foreign Exchange Control Board $28 million worth of
foreign exchange and $226 million worth of gold. To provide the
Board with fuhds to buy gold and exchange, the Bank purchased
$325 million worth of Dominion i percent 1-year notes and Treas-
ury bills. In this way the Bank's holdings of gold and foreign ex-
change were in effect replaced by holdings of Dominion securities,
and ownership of gold reserves was transferred to the Foreign Ex-
change Control Board.
Nervousness over adverse war news led to a renewed demand for
currency in the spring of 1940. Since then currency circulation has
29continued to increase for much the same reasons as in the United
States: the rise in incomes, especially among groups that do not use
banks; increased ratio of payrolls to total income payments; the use
of cash rather than deposits by men in the armed forces; shifts in
location of population and disruption of bank connections; increased
bank charges; and the greater relative importance of goods and
services usually paid for in cash.23 Apart from this drain on cash, the
chartered banks have needed central bank support mainly to finance
their own acquisitions of government securities. In four war years,
the Bank acquired enough securities to offset the transfer of foreign
exchange and the increased public demand for currency, and to add
$icomillion to chartered bank reserves.
After the fall of France, as Carada's war production program got
into full swing and excess capacity and unemployment had largely
disappeared, the officially declared fiscal and monetary policy was to
• limit further monetary expansion as much as possible. Nevertheless,
the Bank of Canada continued to provide the chartered banks with
whatever cash was required to keep their reserve ratios constant in
the face of wartime needs. The result has been open market pur-
chases of government securities on an ever-increasing scale. The only
special issues bought by the Bank of Canada were those in connec-
tion with financing the Foreign Exchange Control Board and the
refunding operations; the Bank's subscriptions to Victory Loans
have been negligible.24 Except for $193 million in 2-21/2 year notes
bought in June 1942, to finance government purchases of sterling
from FECB, increases in Bank of Canada holdings of Dominion-
Provincial securities since the first year of war have been acquired
mainly on the open market. Increased Bank of Canada holdings
have amounted to i6% percent of the rise in debt in the first four
years of war, while the Federal Reserve Banks have taken only 5 per-
cent of the increase in American debt. Even if the $251 million
received in exchange for reserves are excluded, the Canadian figure
is still over i 2 percent. The Canadian banking system as a whole,
however, has taken a smaller share of the wartime increase of
national debt than the American banks.
23 See Charles R. Whittlesey, The Effect of War on Currency and Deposits (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, Occasional Paper 11,
1943), and Federal Reserve Bulletin (June 1943) p. 499.
24 "Special issues" is used here in the same sense as in Table 4, and does not include
Treasury bills or Treasury deposit certificates.
•30Foreign Exchange Control Board
While legally a distinct body subject to direction by the Minister of
Finance, the Foreign Exchange Control Board is in close working
relationship with the Bank of Canada. The Bank is the Board's
"technical advisor and agent," 25theBank Governor is also Chair-
man of the Board, and many of the technical personnel of the
Control Board have been recruited from the Bank. The Board was
set up on September 15, 1939,anda Foreign Exchange Control
Order was enacted permitting the Board to use the Exchange Fund
established by the Exchange Fund Act of '935 for the purpose of
controlling fluctuations in foreign exchange rates.
Like the pound sterling, the Canadian dollar depreciated in the
last days of August i and when exchange control was introduced,.
the premium on American funds had risen to about i ipercent.
Since September 1939, the Board has maintained the official pre-
mium on the United States dollar at io percent buying and i i per-
cent selling, equivalent to a discount rate on the Canadian dollar in
the United States of 9 3/32 to 9 29/32 percent. The main feature of
Canadian exchange control has been rigorous limitation of capital
exports and travel expenditures, and non-essential commodity im-
ports have been restricted as well. Under the Foreign Exchange Ac-
quisition Order of April 1940, all Canadian residents are required
to sell their foreign exchange to the Board except for normal work-
ing balances; the banks act as agents of the Board, and receive /8 of
1 percent commission on all foreign exchange handled.
In addition to the official market for Canadian funds, there is a
recognized unofficial market for transactions not subject to the regu-
lations of the Board, such as transfers from one non-resident to an-
other. The American market for unofficial Canadian dollars has
fluctuated widely at times, especially in the early months of exchange
control, and fell to a low of U.S. $.78 in May 1940. The supply of
unofficial Canadian dollars has since dried up, and the unofficial
rate now prevails close to the official rate.
As mentioned above, the Foreign Exchange Control Board was
advanced $325 million to assist it to acquire gold and foreign ex-
change from the Bank of Canada and from residents. Additional
needs for Canadian dollars have appeared from time to time, and
these have been met by temporary borrowing from the Bank of
26 Bank of Canada, Annual Retort (1940)p. 8.
31Canada, or by advances from the Department of Finance. During
the late thirties Canada had a favorable balance of payments amount-
ing to some $2oo million annually, that could be used to reduce
foreign indebtedness. Her large import surplus from the United
States and her larger debit balance of interest and dividends payable
to the United States were in considerable measure offset by Ameri-
can tourist expenditure in Canada and by sale of gold to the United
States Treasury.26 Net exports to the United Kingdom outweighed
net interest and dividends due the United Kingdom, and left a large
credit balance in favor of Canada. The balance on current account
with other countries was also favorable.
With the outbreak of war, this convenient triangular structure
was seriously disrupted. Both exports to Britain and imports from
the United States expanded enormously, but Great Britain found
it increasingly difficult to make payments for imports from Canada.
The third side of the triangle, exports to, non-Empire countries
other than the United States, soon dwindled to insignificance. Dur-
ing the first year of war England sold $250millionworth of gold to
Canada, and increased her commodity exports to Canada by $24
million,but since then Canada has in effect paid for her own ex-
ports to Great Britain, except for U.S. $150 million transferred by
Britain early in 1943.Asshown in Table 7,upto the end of fiscal
1942,thechief methods of financing the sterling area's deficiency
of Canadian dollars were to accumulate sterling balances in London
and to repatriate British-held Canadian securities.
In March 1942,the"War Appropriations (United Kingdom) Act"
authorized outright gifts to the British government of $i billion
worth of war supplies to cover the Canadian dollar deficiency of the
sterling area. At the same time, $700millionworth of the sterling
balances was consolidated into a loan, interest free during the war,
and with a term and interest rate to be determined after the war.
The "billion dollar gift" was expected to last a year, but it was
exhausted by the end of 1942.27 In February 1943,theMutual Aid
26 Recent revisions of estimates of net tourist expenditures in Canada suggest that they
had been previously overestimated by at least 100 percent.It seems likely that net
balance of payments to the United States was substantial even after American tourist
expenditures and gold sales had been deducted. See Dominion Bureau of Statistics,
Canada's Tourist Trade 1940.
27 It was to cover deficiencies accruing before a new arrangement was made that $150
million of American exchange was made available to Canada.
32TABLE 7— FINANCING' OF STERLING AREA'S DEFICIENCY OF
CANADIAN DOLLARS TO AUGUST 31, 1943
(in millions)







Sales of gold and U. S. dollars by
United Kingdom to Canada $250 $166fl
Private repatriation of securities, gifts, etc. 126 48a
Financed by government of Canada: '
By accumulation of sterling 892 — 892
Official repatriation of Dominion's direct and ,
guaranteed securities 626 73a
'War Appropriations Act" gift .. 1,000
Mutual Aid Act .. , 192
Interest Free Loan .. 700
TOTAL $1,894 $1,287
Sources: Department of Finance, Loan Prospectus (January 14, 1943); Bank of Canada,
Statistical Summary (April-May and August-September 1943).
a To March 31, 1943 only.
Program was introduced, making $i billion of war supplies avail-
able under a variety of terms to all the United Nations with provi-
sions for reciprocal assistance wherever possible. At that time too,
Canada purchased from Great Britain $200 million worth of invest-
ments in war plants in Canada. Aid to Britain has constituted nearly
40 percent of total Canadian expenditures, and has added materially
to the magnitude of the problem of war finance.
American tourist expenditures, "a small but encouraging inflow
of capital from the United States," 28 and sale of gold to the Ameri-
can Treasury prevented any acute American dollar shortage during
the first eight months of war. From then on, however, American
dollar deficits led to serious depletion of reserves of gold and foreign
exchange. This depletion was relieved by the "1-lyde Park Declara-
tion" of April 1941. The Declaration, made jointly by the President
of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada, had two
main features. First, war materials sent to Canada for ultimate de-
livery to Great Britain as war supplies could be financed under
the terms of the Lend-Lease agreement with Great Britain, an ar-
rangement which relieved Canada of the necessity of finding Ameri-
can dollars for much of her imports from'the United States. Second,
28 Budget Speech (June 1940) p. 6.
33the American government agreed to buy direct from Canada "cer-
tain kinds of munition, strategic materials, aluminum, and ships."
Such purchases were originally expected to run to $200or$300mil-
lion annually, but it appears that the actual figure has been much
higher.29 Rising American prices have increased both the supply of
and demand for American dollars on commodity account. However,
net capital imports from the United States reached an unprecedented
volume in 1943. These transfers arose partly from a belief that the
Canadian dollar was undervalued, partly from the higher yield on
Canadian securities, and partly from fears of American inflation.
Some of the more important factors in the Canadian exchange posi.
tion are summarized in Table 8.
TABLE 8— CAPITAL IMPORTS AND BORROWING OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE




Twelve MonthsEnding August 31
Total
1940 1941 1942 1943
Net Capital Imports
























Sources: Bank of Canada, Statistical Summary (August-September 1943), and Dominion
Bureau of Statistics, Sales and Purchases of Securities Between Canada and Other
Countries, various issues.
In a free exchange market rising American prices and increasingly
heavy capital exports would tend to raise the value of the Canadian
dollar in New York. In terms of the "purchasing power parity equa-
tion," the Canadian dollar was undervalued at the end of 1943as-
suming that the prewar rate of exchange was an "equilibrium" rate.
However, the "purchasing power parity" approach is even less re-
liable in war than in peace, because of the greater inadequacy of
published price indices. Moreover, termination of Hyde Park de-
liveries and removal of present exchange controls at any time would
29 Budget Speech (June 1942) p. 4. Among the items which Canada is called upon to
supply are: aluminum, cargo ships, corvettes and minesweepers, anti-aircraft guns,
shells, small arms ammunition, gun barrels, chemicals, nickel, lead, zinc, universal
carriers, aircraft, and certain secret devices.
34partially offset rising American prices and capital exports. It is rea-
sonable to suppose that wartime foreign exchange policy has been
influenced by considerations pertinent to postwar stability as well
as by the current exchange position.
The Chartered Banks
Since the outbreak of war, and especially during the third and fourth
war years, the primary function of the chartered banks has been to
help finance war loans. This observation is borne out by the data
presented in Table g. Commercial loans increased only $20 million




Twelve MonthsEnding August 31
Total
1940 1941 1942 1943
Commercial loans $94 $92 $ —139 $ —27 $20
Temporary financing of instalment
subscriptions to Victory Loans .. 98 — 63 95 130
Dominion-Provincial securities
(own account) 118 218 511 376,1,223
Other securities — 31 — 21 — 16 —25 — 93
Source: Bank of Canada, StatisticalSummary (August-September1943) p.59.
in four years of war, and actually dropped $i66 million in the last
two war years. Holdings of non-government securities have fallen
throughout the entire war period. The most important change in
chartered bank assets is the rise in their own holdings of Dominion-
Provincial securities, which ma)' be safely assumed to consist entirely
of Federal securities. The banks have also provi4ed temporary
financing for something like 25 percent of their customers' subscrip.
tions to war loans. Within six months after a campaign, loans
against the current issue are permitted at a rate equal to the return
on the bonds. However, such loans must be paid off within six
months, and accordingly bank financing of public subscriptions has
resulted in no serious increase in bank deposits.
The chartered banks absorbed only 19 percent of the increase in
debt up to the end of the fourth year of war, while all insured Ameri-
can member banks took nearly 39 percent of the rise in American
debt from June 30, 1939toJune 30, 943. Excluding the securities
received by the Bank of Canada in return for its gold and foreign
35TABLE 10—INcREAsES IN CANADIAN GOVERNMENT DEBT (PAYABLE IN




TwelveMonths Ending August 31
Total
1940 1941 1942 1943
Increase in:
Canadian government debt $677 $1,296 $1,378 $2,818 $6,209
Chartered bank holdingsa 118 146b 448b 471b 1,183
Bank of Canada holdings 388c 110 209 270 977
Total holdings of banking
system 506 256 657 741 2,160
Percent of Increase in Government
Debt Represented by:
Chartered bank holdings 18% 11% 33% 17% 19%
Bank of Canada holdings 57c 9 15 9 16
Total holdings of banking ,
system 75 20 48 26 35
Source: Bank of Canada, StatisticalSummary(August-September1943).
a IncludesDominion-guaranteed and Provincial obligations, but increases can be
assumed to consist of Federal securities only.
b Includes loans and security holdings connected with instalment purchases of Victory
Bonds amounting to $98 million, $63 million and $95 million for the second, third,
and fourth war years respectively.
c Includes $325million notespurchasedtofinance FECB gold and exchange
acquisitions.
exchange, the Canadian banking system as a whole accounts for less
than 31 percent of the rise in debt; when these are included the
figure is 35 percent. The American banking system absorbed over
48 percent of the rise in American debt between June 30, 1939 and
June 30, 1943.30 The growth of Canadian government debt and hold-
ings of the banking system are compared in Table io.
Chartered bank cash subscriptions to war loans have been neg-
ligible, and "conversion subscriptions" have not been large.3' The
30 For Canada the figure includes increased holdings of chartered banks, the Bank of
Canada, and an estimate for the Quebec savings banks, trust companies, mortgage and
loan 'companies, etc., based on figures of subscriptions. For the United States, the
figure includes all insured banks (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Reports),
mutual savings banks (Treasury Bulletins and Annual Reports of the Comptroller of
the Currency), and Federal Reserve Banks (Federal Reserve Bulletins).
81 As shown in Table 5 above, in some War Loans, earlier issues maturing or called
for redemption were accepted in exchange for the new issues. The banking system
held some of the bonds thus accepted for conversion, and made use of the conversion
privilege to the extent of $42 million in war year 1941 and $117 million in war year
1942.TABLE 11 —ESTIMATEDRESALES OF GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
PURCHASED BY THE PUBLIC TO THE BANKING SYSTEM,
WAR YEARS 1940-43
(dollar figures in millions)
Item
Twelve Months Ending A ugssst 31
Total
. 1940 1941 1942 1943
Net public subscriptionsa $233 $1,077 $918 $2,346 $4,574
Resales to banking systemb 35 64 177 334 607
kesales in percent of net
subscriptions 15% 6% 19% 14% 13%
Source: Bank of Canada, Statistical Summary(August-September1943).
aCalculatedas the sum of net sales of war savings certificates, war savings stamps, antI
bonds to the public, plus one-quarter of net sales of Treasury bills, minus 60 percenl
of redemptions payable in Canada, as shown in Table 4.
b Increase in holdings of banking system (Table 10) pIus redemptions and resales by
the banking system to government funds, minus direct purchases, calculated as the
sum of special issues, deposit certificates, and three-quarters of Treasury bills as shown
in Table 4, plus cash subscriptions to war loans of $1 million in each of the war years
194 1-42.
banks have, however, bought substantial amounts of various Federal
securities in the open market. Assuming that three-quarters of the
net increases in Treasury bills have gone into the banking system,
total holdings of government securities by the banking system have
increased by more than the system's direct purchases from the gov-
ernment in every war year but the first. Conversion subscriptions
merely replace earlier issues with new ones, and any excess of the
increase in holdings over cash purchases from the government must
represent purchases from the public. Redemptions of maturing is-
sues other than those called for conversion would in themselves re-
duce holdings, and replacement by open market purchases can be
assumed to the extent of such redemptions. It seems conservative to
estimate total bank holdings of maturing obligations at 40 percent.82
The banks also held small amounts of maturing provincial bonds,
and fairly substantial amounts of government bonds have been re-
absorbed from the banking system by Federal agencies and funds.
An estimate of the resale of public issues to the banking system by
the public is shown in Table 11. It amounts to about $6oo million
32 The banking system held over 35 percent of the direct and guaranteed Dominion
debt payable in Canadian dollars when war began, and over 40 percent after four
years of war. Since the banks probably buy some long-terms on the open market as
they approach maturity, their share in redemptions would be higher than their share
intotaldebt outstanding..
37in four years of war, or 13percentof the net bond sales to the public.
In addition to direct resales to the banks, the public has sold some
of its Canadian government obligations to American investors.
Other things being equal, liquidation by non-bank investors of gov-
ernment bonds tends to bring about expansion of bank deposits,
whether they are sold to banks or to foreign holders.
It must be pointed out that all the bonds purchased in the market
by chartered banks do not stay in their hands. Chartered bank
purchases of special issues are almost exactly equal to the rise in their
holdings of government obligations plus probable share of redemp-
tions and resales to government agencies and funds; accordingly,
they have made little net acquisition of governments apart from
special issues, and their purchases of government securities from the
public must have been largely offset by sales to the Bank of Canada.
The figures of the Bank's holdings shown in Table 6 confirm this
conclusion. Thus the banks are in effect intermediaries between the
public and the Central Bank. While influenced by the whole con-
stellation of wartime financial policies, the process is primarily the
result of the Bank's policy of providing the banks with reserves to
meet the drain on cash and buy whatever volume of special obliga-
tions the government finds necessary.
Canada seems to be somewhat more successful than the United
States in selling war bonds outside the banking system, and almost
equally successful in keeping them there. A calculation for the United
States shows that the banks resold to the public in the third year of
War ir slightly more government obligations than they bought from
the public, but the net "rebound" from the public into the banking
system was about 13percentof net sales to the public in the fourth
war year. "Rebounds" of this magnitude are scarcely surprising in
either country. It seems beyond question that under the pressure of
Victory Loan drives many Canadians subscribed for more bonds
than they found it convenient to carry. There are indications, too,
that Canadian corporations subscribed for more than they intended
to hold for any length of time, either because of the advertising
value attached to large subscriptions from corporations on the Spe-
cial Names list, or simply because they had a temporary surfeit of
cash. No doubt the rise in tax rates is partially responsible for these
liquidations of private and corporate holdings.
Such resales diminish the effectiveness of war loans in reducing
38consumer spending and checking inflation. As early as August 1942,
the National War Finance Committee published an advertisement
in the Canadian press with the admonitiQn "Don't be a Welsher!"
urging subscribers to hang on to their war bonds. In the May i4
campaign the NWFC tried to persuade the public to hold, as well
as buy, the Fourth Victory Loan. As mentioned above, the Finance
Minister later listed the education of the public to the need of
holding the war issues they buy as one of four future objectives of
the Committee. On the other hand, some corporations feel they are
helping to smooth the market by acquiring large amounts of bonds
during a campaign and disposing of them gradually as the market
is able to absorb them. To the extent that this claim is well founded,
such corporations are performing a sort of banking function through
their war loan policy.
Role of Life Insurance Companies
Life insurance companies figure prominently in the Canadian econ-
omy. Before the war, the people of Canada were investing about
half their personal savings in life insurance, a larger proportion than
any other nation.33 The choice of investment outlets for these savings
is a matter of no little importance for the economy as a whole.
whether in war or in peace. During the present war, life insurance
companies have made increasingly heavy contributions to public
war loans, and their subscriptions to the first five Victory Loans
amounted to $7 million, over 13 percent of the total.
Shortly after Canada entered the war, the Canadian Life Insur-
ance Officers Association assured the Finance Minister of "fullest
possible support of Canadian life insurance companies to govern-
ment loans." They offered to release key men for participation in
the sale of war loans and war savings certificates, and agreed to in-
vest any increased receipts in war loans. Actually, as Table i 2 shows,
investments by life insurance companies in Dominion war issues has
far exceeded the modest increase in their net receipts, and over ioo
percent of net receipts from Canadian business has been used for
this purpose. Annual subscriptions to war loans of all companies
33 This statement, which was made by E. C. MacDonald of the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company of Canada in an address to the Life Underwriters Association of
Montreal (Montreal Gazette, March 19, 1942), has been independently checked by the
author. 'Mr. MacDonald's figures were 52.4 percent for Canada and 41 percent for the
United States.
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1939 1940 1941 1942
Canadian Companies
Net receipts from Canadian
business $64 $63 $78 $89 $294
Subscriptions to war loans .. 39 85 208 333
Increase in Dominion
obligations held .. 41 74 143 258
British and Foreign Companies
Operating in Canadaa
Net receipts from Canadian
business 21 25 32 41 119
Subscriptions to war loans .. lOb 24 69 101
Canadian Life Insurance Officers Association. Source: Department of Insurance,
aIncreasein Dominion obligations held not available for British and foreign companies.
bEstimatebased on proportion of subscriptions to Victory Loans.
operating in Canada have risen from 56 percent of net receipts from
Canadian business in 1940to213percentin 1942. During 1940and
1941,Canadiancompanies' holdings of Canadian municipal and
public utility bonds increased substantially, but in 1942 holdings of
all categories of Canadian bonds, other than Dominion, actually fell.
Participation in the Fourth Victory Loan was heavier than ever,
but did not maintain the rate of increase in insurance company sub-
scriptions, and subscriptions to the Fifth Victory Loan were only
$6 million more than for the Fourth. It seems likely that these com-
panies have reached the point where they cannot be expected to
absorb government bonds at a rate faster than they are now doing.
With an eye to the long-term nature of their obligations, insur-
ance companies have concentrated their holdings of government
securities in higher-yield maturities. Their subscriptions have been
entirely for the long-term issues, except for $millionon the First
Victory Loan and $200,000onthe Second, and because of their
established policy of adjusting their portfolio to the pattern of in-
terest rates, they probably hold few issues to maturity. Their con-
version subscriptions have been only $44 million, and their share
in other redemptions has presumably not been large. However,
Canadian life insurance companies, along with other investors, have
40been disposing of certain types of Dominion securities, such as Cana-
dian National Railway bonds, which have found their way over the
American border. Consequently, the increase in holdings of Domin-
ion obligations has been considerably less than subscriptions to war
loans.
On the whole, the insurance companies have more than fulfilled
their promise to support war finance operations to the full. The
privilege granted to taxpayers of deducting life insurance premiums
from the minimum savings requirement of the income tax is mainly
a reflection of the importance of insurance in Canadian savings, and
of the government's desire not to impose tax barriers to continued
saving in this form.34 At the same time the knowledge that any con-
sequent rise in earnings of insurance companies would go directly
to the coffers of the government has made the granting of this priv-
ilege compatible with the government's anti-inflationary aims.
Role of Other Business Concerns
Corporations (excluding life insurance companies and banks) have
accounted for over one-third of the subscriptions to war loans.33 The
34 Not only premiums on existing policies, but half the first year's and all subsequent
premiums on new policies, may be deducted. Thus the privilege not only encourages
maintenance of policies already in force, but provides an additional incentive to take
out new ones. The government declined to make all premiums on new policies
deductible, since about half the first year's premiums go to the insurance agent as
commission.
35 Business subscriptions to the first five Victory Loans (Third to Seventh War Loans)
were as follows (in millions):
First Second ThirdFourth Fifth
Conver- Conver- Conver-
Cashsion CashsionCash Cash Cashsion
•Business in
manufacturing $242 $6 $276$3 $298 $377 $401 $3
Mining 39.. 29 9 44 55 48
Insurance other
than life 6 2 11 0.5 12 15 13 1
Miscellaneous
financial a a a a 26 42 39 1
Total $295 $328 $380 $489 $506
Source: Statements by Mr. Ilsley to the House of Commons, June 28 and Decembes
14, 1943.
aIncludedwith "business and manufacturing."
41role of other insurance companies, trust companies, mortgage and
loan companies, and other financial organizations, has been small,
and the same is true of colleges, churches, associations and funds,
and similar institutions. The combined total for such organizations
is about 4 percent of total war loan subscriptions. Nearly one-third
of total subscriptions to the Victory Loans have come from busi-
ness firms and corporations whose main function is non-financial.
•Since detailed portfolios are not published, it is impossible to say
to just what extent these subscriptions have increased total business
holdings of government obligations. Conversions have been small
relative to cash subscriptions, since non-financial firms were not
heavy investors in government securities before the war and accord-
ingly held only small amounts of the issues called for conversion.
For the same reason it is unlikely that maturities of other issues have
been of real importance. There are some indications that business
concerns are responsible for the bulk of resales to banks, but even
if they accounted for the entire "rebound," when the Fifth VictOry
Loan drive closed, businesses held nearly $1.5 billion more in gov-
ernment obligations than they did before the war.
Individuals
Over 40 percent of the total value of subscriptions to war loans came
from individuals, of which less than 7 percent was from people on
the Special Names list.6 There were 3.0 million subscriptions (ex-
cluding Special Names) to the Fifth Victory Loan, from a popula-
tion of i 1.5 million. Thus sales were apparently made well down the
income scale. "Employee applications" account for less than io per-
cent of the value, but over half the number of total subscriptions.
Likewise, subscriptions to $50 and $ioo bonds excluding payroll
36 Subscriptions of individuals to the first five Victory Loans were as follows (in
millions):
First Second ThirdFourth Fifth
Conver- Conver- • Conver-
Cashsion CashsionCash Cash Cashsion
Special Names$87 $1 $29 $1 $26 $37 $27 $2
Others 279 34 335.. 375 530 604 38
Total $351 $366 $401 $567 $671
Source: Statements by Mr. lisley to the House of Commons, June 28 and
December 14, 1943.
42applications, most of which come from individuals, are low in dol-
lars yielded and high in number. Interestingly enough, subscriptions
to small denomination bonds are dwindling relative to both num-
ber and value of total subscriptions from all sources. Figures re-
leased by NWFC show that resales of $50 and $100 bonds consti-
tuted a very high proportion of the total number of sales, reaching
24 percent for the Second Victory Loan, but their total dollar value
was relatively small. Individuals have probably kept all but $ioo to
$200 million of their subscriptions, leaving them with nearly $2.5
billion more government securities after the Fifth Victory Loan
campaign than they held before the war, including war savings cer-
tificates of over $150 million. These holdings clearly represent a
substantial rise in liquid claims readily convertible into purchasing
power by sale on the market.
Government Accounts
Published records of the National War Finance Committee show
that Federal, provincial, and municipal governments have bought
relatively small amounts of war loans —about5 percent of the total.
Their subscriptions have been almost entirely in cash, suggesting
that even these modest holdings are something of a novelty for them.
Federal government units have subscribed less than half as much
to these five loans as provincial and local units.37
Summary.
Table 13providesa summary percentage distribution of subscrip-
tions to the five Victory Loans. Unfortunately, no comparable figures
are available for the first two War Loans. The table demonstrates
the dominant position of individual and business subscriptions, and
shows that direct bank support has been negligible.
37 Government subscriptions to the first five Victory Loans were as follows (in millions):
First SecondThirdFourth Fifth
Conver-
Cash Cash Cash Cash Cash sion
Federal $10 $20 $23 $31 $22 $2
Provincialand local 21 27 32 54 56 0.2
Total $32 $47 $55 $85 $81
Source: Statements by Mr. Ilsicy to the House of Commons, June 28 and
December 14, 1943.
43TABLE 13— PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CASH SUBSCRIPTIONS
OF VARIOUS GROUPS TO VICTORY LOANS
Group First Second Third Fourth FiJth
Business md.mfg.
and mining 40%a 37%a 35% 33% 33%
Individuals 43 43 40 43 46
Government 4 6 5 7 6
Banks (Bank of Canada
0
and chartered) 1 .. b b ..
Life insurance 12 14 16 13 13
All otherc ,•• •, 4 4 4
Source: Statements by Mr. lisley to the House of Commons, June 28 and December
14, 1943.
aIncludes"all other."
b Less than .5 percent.,
cIncludesinsurance other than life, Quebec savings banks, pension and benevolent
funds, trust companies, charitable organizations, etc.
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